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The Politics of Related Lending
Abstract
We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their own-
ers, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the
banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country.
Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive
environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from
the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in
localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.
I. Introduction
Banks play an important role in financing governments. While banks’ holdings of gov-
ernment bonds have attracted much attention in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, banks’
direct loans to governments also account for a substantial portion of government financing
in many countries. For example, Eminescu (2011) in a study of European countries found
that bank loans accounted for as much as 67% of public debt in the year 2009.1 Stylized
facts suggest that bank loans are a particularly common financing choice for local and
regional governments outside the U.S, perhaps because of prohibitively high costs of bond
issues.2
When providing financing to governments, banks are often dealing with borrowers
that are endowed with coercive power. Such power derives from the many ways in which
governments interact with banks: as regulators, tax authorities, and sometimes as own-
ers. Our focus in this paper is on the latter relationship. Government ownership of banks
is quite common in many countries around the world. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer ( 2002) analyze a sample of 92 countries and find that, on average, government-
owned banks control about 42% of the assets of a country’s 10 largest banks. These
findings were based on data about the year 1995, but more recent contributions confirm
that government ownership of banks remains high.3 When governments act in a dual ca-
1Estonia and Luxembourg had the highest fraction of public debt financed with bank loans (67% and
60%), consistent with the idea that these countries find it costly to issue bonds. However, even Germany,
which has well developed capital markets, had 20% of public debt financed with bank loans.
2The United States is unusual in the preferential tax treatment given to municipal bonds. In addition,
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) reports that, in the year 2010, it rated only 294 local and regional govern-
ments (LRGs) outside the U.S. (See S&P’s “International Local And Regional Governments Default And
Transition Study, 2010 Update” available on S&P’s website.) This indicates that few non-U.S. LRGs
have access to bond markets.
3See Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007) and Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007).
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pacity as owners and borrowers of banks, politicians may be tempted to take advantage of
captive banks in order to obtain government financing at favorable terms. This possibility
is the focus of our analysis.
To examine the lending of government owned banks to their owners we make use of
a unique data set of savings banks that are owned by Austrian municipalities. Each of
the banks is owned by a di↵erent government, but these governments all exhibit a similar
institutional structure and are governed by identical federal rules. In addition, the banks
are all regulated by the same federal agency. We are thus able to investigate the banks’
lending to the municipalities, while controlling for regulatory and institutional di↵erences.
These controls enable us to concentrate instead on di↵erences in lending practices, bank
profitability, and the political and economic environments of the municipalities.
We first compare the municipally owned banks with other Austrian banks that also
made loans to municipalities, but were not controlled by municipalities. We find evidence
that municipal lending was significantly less profitable for the municipally owned banks
than for the non-municipal banks. We next examine di↵erences across the municipalities
that own banks and find that the profitability of lending to the municipalities is correlated
with the level of political competition and the level of wealth (GDP per capita) in the
region. We find evidence that politicians with less secure reelection prospects are more
prone to take advantage of their captive banks, and that this e↵ect is more pronounced
in areas with high GDP per capita.
In order to measure the profitability of the banks’ municipal loans we regress a number
of di↵erent bank performance measures on the quantity of municipal lending that is
done by the bank. To control for cross-sectional variation in loan funding costs, we
analyze the change in the regression coe cient around a natural experiment that occurred
when Austria joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. At this time Austria became
immediately subject to EU regulations. These regulations imposed new transparency
requirements on public procurement, as well as strict rules against market distortions
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and entry barriers in municipal loan markets. Stylized facts suggest that these regulatory
changes, together with EU supervision, made it harder for municipal politicians to coerce
captive banks into providing municipal financing at below-market terms.4 An extreme
case in point is the case of the Austrian Hypo Alpe Adria bank, that was publicly criticized
by the EU for lending to some Austrian municipalities at below-market terms.5
We employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis: we first examine the di↵erence in bank
profitability related to municipal lending before and after Austria’s EU accession, and
then examine the di↵erence in this di↵erence between municipal banks and non-municipal
banks. All of the banks su↵ered a decrease in interest revenues and net interest revenues
(net of interest expense) relative to loans, following Austria’s EU accession. This decrease
is likely due to increased competition from banks outside of Austria. There, however,
emerges a di↵erence between the two groups of banks when we analyze how municipal
lending contributed to profitability. For the non-municipal banks municipal loans were
more profitable prior to the EU accession (pre-EU) in terms of several performance mea-
sures (return on assets, interest revenue and net interest revenue). This result makes sense
in light of both the increased competition and the new regulations surrounding municipal
lending. By contrast, municipal loans were less profitable prior to the EU accession for
the municipally owned banks. This result suggests that, prior to the onset of stricter reg-
ulation and increased transparency (pre-EU) the municipalities took advantage of their
4As part of the new rules, banks that submit losing bids to provide municipal financing can now
request information about the terms of the winning bid. Competing banks can thus help to enforce the
rules against market distortions. As argued by Levine (2004) such enforcement by competitors can be
even more e↵ective than enforcement by regulators.
5The municipalities are located in the Austrian state of Carinthia, and this state was until recently
the owner of Hypo. The European Commission’s criticism of Hypos’ lending practices with respect to the
municipalities was the subject of a news story presented on Austrian national television on September
17, 2010. A (German) summary of the news story is available on the website for the Carinthian channel
of Austria’s national TV station, under http://kaernten.orf.at/stories/470364/.
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captive banks to engage in unprofitable government financing.
We further hypothesize that the incidence of unprofitable municipal lending has a po-
litical component. The municipal banks typically do not have access to capital markets,
so being forced to make loans at terms that do not cover the loans’ opportunity costs,
can crowd out private borrowers. From the perspective of government politicians, such
crowding-out is a concern because it can impair a government’s tax base. We hypothe-
size that the extent to which politicians internalize this cost depends on their reelection
prospects, because any impairment of a government’s tax base will emerge only over time.
We thus expect that politicians with lower reelection prospects will exercise less restraint
in forcing government-owned banks to engage in unprofitable government financing.
We again use a di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach to test our political hypothesis. Us-
ing data from elections prior to the EU accession we subdivide our sample of municipal
banks into two sets: banks that are located in regions that have experienced a high de-
gree of political competition and those that have experienced low political competition.
We then examine the di↵erence between banks in politically competitive and noncom-
petitive regions in the change in the banks’ profitability around Austria’s EU accession.
We find evidence consistent with municipalities using related lending to transfer profits
out of their banks for both sets of municipally owned banks. However, the evidence is
significantly stronger for those banks owned by municipalities where elected o cials face
greater reelection uncertainty. Consistent with our hypothesis, this result suggests that
politicians with poor reelection prospects were more willing to force their banks to engage
in unprofitable government financing. The above-mentioned case of Hypo Alpe Adria and
its unprofitable lending to municipalities is a case in point since this bank was controlled
by a government run by a party that never had an absolute majority and was relatively
insecure in its reelection prospects.
We also investigate the possibility that our measures of political competition proxy for
some other e↵ects of Austria’s EU accession on the banks. In the remainder of the analysis
4
we test the credibility of alternative explanations for our political results. The most
prominent alternative explanation is related to the increased competition that Austrian
banks faced after Austria joined the EU. An increase in banking competition can have
two e↵ects that are relevant for our analysis. First, it may reduce the opportunity costs
that the municipal banks incurred in lending to the municipalities, causing municipal
lending to become relatively more profitable. However, lending to municipalities also
became more competitive and our evidence indicates that even though municipal lending
became relatively more profitable for the municipal banks, it became less profitable for
non-municipal banks.
The second e↵ect is that greater banking competition in the post-EU period may have
led to better enforcement of the EU rules. Such an e↵ect could drive our results if, for
example, our measures of political competition are merely picking up cross-sectional di↵er-
ences in the competition for municipal lending. We indeed find that political competition
is positively correlated both with per capita GDP and the number of bank branches in a
municipality, both of which may proxy for competition in municipal lending.6 We thus
check if our results concerning political competition could be due simply to the positive
correlation between political competition and per capita GDP or the number of bank
branches. We find that while both of these variables, especially per capita GDP, have
some explanatory power for our results, they do not fully explain the relation between
political competition and the profitability of municipal lending.
Our analysis is related to the literature on “related lending”, i.e., bank lending to
“related” borrowers (owners and managers). Within this literature, our results are most
similar to those of LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003), Laeven (2001), and
Bae, Kang and Kim (2002), in that we provide evidence consistent with a looting view of
6Municipalities may borrow from banks that do not have branches in the town. We expect outside
banks to pay more attention to municipalities with higher GDP. For this reason we take into account
GDP as well as the number of banks in a town.
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related lending. Lamoreaux (1994) and Maurer and Haber (2007), in contrast, argue that
banks can benefit from related lending, because such lending can mitigate informational
asymmetries between banks and their borrowers.7 Our work di↵ers from this literature
in that we focus on politics and bank management. It is also unlikely that the banks in
our sample realized informational benefits in lending to their municipal owners, because
during the time of our study these municipalities were uniformly perceived to be relatively
free of default risk.8
Our work is also related to the literature on government ownership of banks. Within
this literature, ours is not the first study to show that politics can a↵ect the lending
decisions of government-owned banks. Dinç (2005) finds that government-owned banks
increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. Sapienza (2004) finds
that Italian government-owned banks charge interest rates that vary across regions and
decrease in the regional power of the party in control of the bank. Khwaja and Mian (2005)
show that politically connected firms in Pakistan receive more and riskier loans from
government-owned banks. Cole (2009) shows that the quantity of agricultural lending
by government-owned banks tracks the electoral cycle in India. Interestingly, he finds
that the largest increases in lending volume can be found in areas in which elections are
particularly close. Our focus on the e↵ect of political competition is also similar to that
of Dinç and Gupta (2011) who find that politicians who face more political competition
are less apt to privatize government-owned firms. While prior papers document political
influence on lending practices, volume and rates, our study is the first to quantify the
negative impact of this political control on overall bank performance. We are also the
first to focus on government financing by government owned banks, rather than lending
7Maurer and Haber (2007) also analyze data about Mexican banks, but from a much earlier period
than in the LaPorta, et al (2003) study.
8We, in fact, know of no Austrian municipal defaults between the end of World War II and the end
of our sample period.
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to households and private firms.9 Our work di↵ers further from earlier work in that we
provide evidence that politically motivated influence on banks is a problem that is not
limited to emerging economies or countries with high corruption levels.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the motivation behind
our analysis and we describe the natural experiment that is at the core of our empirical
analysis. In Section 3 we describe the data and provide some summary statistics. In
Section 4 we present the empirical analysis. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
II. Motivation and Research Strategy
A. Motivation
When governments borrow from banks that they own, the bank owners and the borrowers
are the same – the citizens. The citizens are not, however, the decision makers who are
directly in charge of the loan decisions. The citizens choose politicians to act as their
agents. The politicians typically make the borrowing decisions for the government, and
also have significant influence over the captive banks. Within our sample of municipally
owned banks, each bank’s board of directors typically includes the town’s mayor.
A politician is elected to act in the interests of the citizens, but the citizens cannot
observe everything that the politician does. A potentially significant source of agency
conflicts arises from a politician’s desire to be reelected. Suppose that a politician obtains
personal benefits from reelection. The politician may take actions that appear to benefit
the citizens in the short run, but that are not beneficial in the long run. If the citizens
9We, in fact, demonstrate that loans to nongovernmental parties do not (on average) exhibit the
politically related e↵ects that we find in loans to governments. Our paper is also related to a growing
literature on e↵ects of political agency problems on government financing. For example, Perignon and
Vallee (2013) is a recent contribution analyzing local governments’ use of structured financing. Our
contribution di↵ers due to our focus on governments’ dual role as borrowers and owners of banks.
7
have full information and are rational, such actions should not benefit the politician. The
citizens may not, however, have full information. They may lack information about the
quality of the politician, as in Drazen and Eslava (2010). In our case the citizens also lack
information about the details of the municipally owned banks’ business practices. They
are thus unable to determine whether a good government budget outcome is the result of
the politician’s skill, or hidden wealth transfers from the bank to the government. Such
wealth transfers may be socially suboptimal because the bank may be capital constrained
and its loans to the government may “crowd out” loans to the private sector.10 The
voters may eventually notice the costs of such crowding out, but these costs are hard to
assess and typically realized in the future, while the benefits of hidden wealth transfers
are realized immediately. If the politician has a low probability of reelection, he does
not fully internalize the costs of such wealth transfers. He focuses only on the immediate
benefit of improved reelection prospects. In contrast, a politician who is secure in his
reelection prospects perceives a smaller benefit from such wealth transfers (smaller increase
in reelection prospects) and is more apt to internalize the costs.
This moral hazard model leads us to two predictions. First, banks that are municipally
owned are less likely to profit from their lending to municipalities, as compared to banks
that are not government owned. That is, they are more likely to be “looted” by their
municipal owners. Second, banks that are owned by municipalities in which there is a
high degree of competition between political parties are more likely to be “looted” by their
municipal owners. These predictions are consistent with the case of the Austrian Hypo
Alpe Adria bank cited in the Introduction, which was criticized for lending to Austrian
municipalities at below-market terms. This bank was controlled by a government run by
a party that never had an absolute majority and had to compete hard to be re-elected.11
10The banks in our sample are likely to face capital constraints because they are unlisted and cannot
tap public equity markets.
11Hypo Alpe Adria is not included in the data set that we use in our empirical analysis because it is
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B. The Natural Experiment
Our analysis examines the profitability of banks’ lending to municipal governments that
own them. Profitability depends not only on loan terms but also on loan funding costs,
including opportunity costs. Since opportunity costs are, almost by definition, unob-
servable, we use a natural experiment in order to investigate whether municipally owned
banks were lending to municipal governments at below-cost terms. A key requirement of a
natural experiment is an event, the occurrence of which was independent of the variables
of interest, and that caused exogenous changes in the variables of interest.12 In our case,
the variable of interest is the extent to which municipal politicians could use loans from
municipally owned banks to transfer wealth from the banks to the municipalities, i.e., to
loot the banks.
Our analysis is based on a natural experiment that occurred when Austria joined
the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1995. As of this date Austrian municipalities
were required to start obeying EU Directive 92/50EEC concerning public procurement.
This directive specifies explicit rules for the public procurement of a range of services,
including banking and investment services. The municipalities had to start following
“open procedures [...] whereby all interested service providers may submit a tender”
(Article I(d)), invite su ciently many bidders to “ensure genuine competition” (Article
13), and base the award of contracts on “the lowest price only” (Article 36). The directives
also increased the transparency of municipal borrowing. Upon request, the municipalities
have to report to competing bidders and the European Commission “the name of the
successful tenderer and the reason why this tenderer was selected” (Article 12). These
rules apply whenever the municipalities borrow more than about 1.5 million Euros. Prior
a universal bank and so is not supervised by the supervisory agency from which we got our data. This
agency only supervises savings banks.
12As discussed in Meyer (1995), the relevant exogenous event in economic studies is often a change in
regulations.
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to joining the EU, Austrian municipalities were not required to follow such transparent
procedures.
The EU rules e↵ectively stipulated an increase in transparency and competition in the
market for government financing in Austria. These rule changes that occurred in 1995
had two potential and conflicting e↵ects on Austrian municipalities and municipally owned
banks. First, we would expect the ensuing increase in competition to cause all lending
to municipalities to decrease in profitability. Second, the increase in transparency should
make it more di cult for government owned banks and their municipal owners to engage
in any noncompetitive practices with regard to government financing. If, prior to Austria’s
EU accession, municipal bank owners were using their captive banks to obtain financing
at below market terms, then this increase in transparency could cause an increase in the
profitability of the banks’ lending to their municipal owners.
The overall e↵ect that EU membership had on the profitability of related lending
thus depends on the way in which related lending was being done prior to Austria’s EU
accession. If a lack of competition had led the banks to earn excess profits from this
type of lending, then we should observe a “post-EU” decrease in the profitability of the
related lending. If, instead, the municipalities were using their captive banks to obtain
government financing at unprofitable terms, then we may observe a post-EU increase in
the profitability of the related lending. Furthermore, if the latter e↵ect holds, then based
on the theories outlined in the motivation section, we expect to see a more pronounced
increase in the profitability of related lending for banks that are owned by more politically
competitive municipalities.
Our research strategy thus follows a “di↵-in-di↵” approach. We analyze the di↵erence
between the profitability of related lending prior to EU accession (pre-EU) and following
EU accession (post-EU).13 We then analyze the di↵erence in this di↵erence between banks
13Both the event (joining the EU) and the rule change are exogenous to the variables of interest.
Austria’s decision to join the EU was based on a popular vote that was taken in June 1994. It is hard to
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that are owned by municipalities and non-government owned banks. If municipalities
were not using related lending to loot their banks prior to joining the EU, then the EU-
mandated competition and transparency should have caused municipal lending to decrease
in profitability for all banks. If instead, the municipalities were using related lending to
loot their banks, then the EU mandates should have caused related lending to become
relatively more profitable for the municipally owned banks, and we should be able to
reject the following null hypothesis:
H1: The profitability of lending to municipalities decreased equally for all banks following
the EU accession.
We also analyze the di↵erence in pre- and post-EU di↵erences in the profitability
of municipal lending between banks that are owned by municipalities with a high level
of political competition and those owned by municipalities with a low level of political
competition. The latter analysis aims at identifying e↵ects of political competition on
the profitability of municipally owned banks’ related lending.14 If politicians in more
politically competitive municipalities were more apt to loot their banks, then we should
be able to reject the following null hypothesis:
H2: Any changes in the profitability of municipal lending around the time of Austria’s
EU accession are unrelated to the level of political competition in the municipalities that
own the banks in our sample.
imagine that the rule change a↵ecting the municipal banks was a determining factor in the vote. It was
also not at all clear ex-ante whether the vote would be in favor of joining, so the municipalities could not
anticipate the rule changes.
14The underlying assumption is that the level of political competition is uncorrelated with the lending’s
opportunity costs.
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
A. Financial data about the banks
Our empirical analysis is based on bank-level data about a sample of Austrian, munic-
ipally owned savings banks spanning the decade 1990-1999 (i.e., symmetric around the
event date of the natural experiment in January 1995). This sample is well-suited to
our investigation in that the banks and their owners are homogeneous in terms of many
characteristics, including the institutional structure of the municipal governments, the
regulation of the banks, and the banks’ lack of access to capital markets. We have also
collected bank-level data for a set of non-government owned banks in Austria for the same
time period to provide a comparison with the municipally owned banks.
We obtained data on the municipal banks from the “Sparkassen-Pruefungsverband”.
This institution is under the direct supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance, and
is charged with the financial supervision of savings banks. We obtained additional data
from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) that was used to validate and cross-check our
original data from the Sparkassen-Pruefungsverband. We manually collected bank-level
data on the non-municipal banks from annual reports archived at the Austrian national
library in Vienna. The data include the banks’ annual balance sheets and profit and loss
accounts, as well as information about the compositions of the banks’ loan portfolios. The
latter information enables us to determine the volume of banks’ lending to municipalities.
Data on the terms of individual loans is not obtainable, but our focus in this study is more
general than loan terms. We are interested in the overall profitability of municipal lending,
where profitability captures not only the e↵ect of loan terms, but also the opportunity
costs of engaging in related lending.15
15The municipal banks are mostly small banks that do not have easy access to capital markets, so
opportunity costs may include significant shadow costs of capital. Since the banks do not have publicly
traded equity, we use accounting data to measure profitability.
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To be included in our sample of municipal banks a bank must fulfill the following
criteria: (i) the bank was active, as an independent bank, for at least 3 years before and
after Austria’s EU accession, and (ii) the bank was owned by a municipality during the
sample period. We were able to collect data for a sample of 53 banks that satisfy these
criteria. The set of non-government owned banks includes all non-government owned
Austrian banks for which data could be obtained for the period prior to Austria joining
the EU.
For each bank we have between 3 and 5 observations pre-EU (1990 to 1994) and
between 3 and 5 observations post-EU (1995 to 1999). For each of the banks we calculated
the median value for each variable of interest in the pre-EU period and in the post-EU
period. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these values. RoA denotes the banks’
return on assets. Interest revenue is the bank’s interest revenues divided by total loans.
Net interest revenue is interest revenues minus interest expenses, divided by total loans.
Total assets, TA, are reported in Euros in order to make the information more accessible
to readers.16 We divide the banks’ loan portfolios into loans to municipalities and all
other loans. The ratios of municipal and non-municipal loans to total assets do not sum
up to one because the total assets include non-loan assets, such as investments in traded
securities.
Place Table 1 here.
The banks in our sample were generally profitable. The mean size of the non-municipal
banks is somewhat larger than the municipal banks. The banks are also somewhat larger in
the post-EU period. There is no significant di↵erence in the mean profitability of the banks
in the two periods, in terms of return on assets. Both the municipal and non-municipal
banks experienced significant drops in interest revenue and net interest revenue, relative to
16The data is given in Austrian Schillings (ATS). When producing the numbers in Table 1 we used
the exchange rate: 1 Euro = 13.76 ATS.
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total loans. The fraction of the municipal banks’ assets invested in loans to municipalities
increased significantly after Austria joined the EU, from 3.6% during the pre-EU period
to 17.3% in the post-EU period. Non-municipal banks experienced the opposite pattern:
loans to municipalities decreased from 7.7% in the pre-EU period to 4.4% in the post-
EU period. These changes are explained largely by factors that are exogenous to our
study.17 When Austria joined the EU, changes in tax laws and in transfers between the
federal and local governments also occurred and a↵ected all Austrian municipalities. As
a result many municipalities increased their debt levels. At the same time the larger
non-municipal banks realized opportunities to make loans outside of Austria and found
the more competitive municipal loans to be less attractive.
B. Data about the municipalities
We collected information about the municipalities from Statistik Austria.18 Only munici-
pal banks can be matched to municipalities, as non-municipal banks operate at a broader
than municipal level. This data includes the amount of debt of each municipality, the
population of each municipality and the regional Gross Domestic Product per capita.19
In addition, we have obtained data on the number of bank branches in each municipality
from the Austrian Central Bank. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for these values,
for the set of municipal banks. The GDP per capita increased significantly from the pre-
17In a previous version of the present paper, we presented regressions of the change in the volume of the
municipal banks’ lending to municipalities on measures of political competition and found no significant
relation.
18http://www.statistik.at/web
19GDP data is available only on a regional level that is somewhat coarser than the municipal level.
While our main data set consists of 53 banks and municipalities, the regional GDP data is available for
24 regions.
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EU period to the post-EU period.20 The municipal debt per capita and the number of
bank branches also increased.
For each municipality we construct measures of political competition, using municipal-
level data about the outcomes of elections for representatives in the Austrian national
assembly.21 From the Statistik Austria website we obtained the number of votes that
voters in each municipality cast in favor of each major party in the national elections
that took place in 1990 and 1994. The Austrian political system is a party-based system;
voters place votes for parties. The voting data enables us to determine if a municipality
has strongly and persistently favored one party over all others. By using data about
national elections and data that precedes Austria’s EU accession we are able to construct
exogenous measures of political competition.
We construct two indicators of political competition. Each bank in our sample is
assigned a value of either zero or one for each indicator, where the value one indicates
that the bank is owned by a municipality with a persistent politically competitive en-
vironment.22 For the first measure, Pol1 = NotStable, a municipality is defined as
noncompetitive (Pol1 = 0) if the same party won both elections, and by a margin of at
least 10%; otherwise Pol1 = 1. According to this measure 25 of the municipalities are
identified as politically competitive and 28 as noncompetitive. For the second measure,
20The GDP per capita in our municipalities is somewhat lower than for Austria on average. For
example, the per capita GDP for Austria in 1997 was 23,000 Euros. The reason for this di↵erence is that
our data set includes banks in a number of rural regions and it does not include any banks in the largest
Austrian cities. Vienna, Graz, Linz and Salzburg are not represented in our sample.
21Our methodology is somewhat similar to that of Dinç and Gupta (2011).
22We use the term persistent to stress that our analysis does not focus on one election, but rather
on the e↵ect of a persistent level of political competition that gives elected o cials incentives to abstain
from tax increases and keep up government services, throughout their tenures. In a prior version of the
paper we calculated political competition variables using data from six elections from 1975 to 1994. The
results are similar to those reported here.
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Pol2 = NondominantWinner, a municipality is defined as noncompetitive (Pol2 = 0) if
one party obtained, on average across the two elections, at least 45% of the votes; other-
wise Pol2 = 1. There are more than two parties, so a party may win with less than 50%
of the vote. According to our second measure 28 of the municipalities are identified as
politically competitive and 25 as noncompetitive.
These political measures are summarized in Table 2. Panel A shows that Pol1 and
Pol2 are highly correlated; only three banks are classified di↵erently by the two measures.
Panel B indicates that close to two-thirds of the politically competitive municipalities are
located in regions with greater than the median value of GDP per capita; slightly more
than two-thirds of the politically non-competitive municipalities are located in regions
with less than or equal to the median value of GDP per capita. We address this positive
correlation between political competition and GDP per capita, and its possible significance
for our results, later in the paper.
Place Table 2 here.
IV. The Empirical Analysis
A. Related Lending and Bank Profitability
As discussed in Section 2.2 our empirical analysis consists of examining “di↵erences-
in-di↵erences”. We expect that, due to increased competition following Austria’s EU
accession, all lending in Austria became less profitable. Due to increased regulation of
municipalities, lending to municipalities may have dropped even more in profitability.
However, EU transparency rules also make it di cult for municipalities to borrow from
their own banks at non-market terms. If municipalities that owned banks had been
“looting” these banks through related lending pre-EU, we should find that for these banks
municipal lending became relatively more profitable in the post-EU period, i.e. that
16
HypothesisH1 does not hold. We, thus, examine the di↵erence in profitability in municipal
lending pre- and post-EU, and then examine the di↵erence in this di↵erence between
municipally-owned banks and non-municipal banks. Our main dependent variable when
examining bank performance is return on assets, RoA. We also examine the e↵ect of
municipal lending on interest revenue and net interest revenue. In contrast to the latter
variables, RoA includes the full opportunity costs of municipal lending.
Specifically, we run the following regression to test hypothesis H1:
DVi,t = a1 ⇥ postEUt + a2 ⇥ postEUt ⇥MuniLoansi + a3 ⇥ postEUt ⇥Govti(1)
+ a4 ⇥ postEUt ⇥Govti ⇥MuniLoansi + aXXi,t + ui + ✏i,t .
We use three di↵erent dependent variables (DV ): (i) return on assets, RoA, (ii) net
interest revenue/total loans, and (iii) interest revenue/total loans. PostEU is equal to
one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. Govt is equal to one if the bank
is a government-owned (municipal) bank and zero otherwise. MuniLoans is the bank’s
municipal loans, divided by total assets in the regression with DV = RoA and divided
by the bank’s total loans in the regressions with DV = net interest revenue or interest
revenue. Xi,t is a vector of control variables: non-municipal loans divided by total assets
for the RoA regressions, total loans divided by total assets for the other regressions, and
log(total assets). ui are bank-specific fixed e↵ects. Municipalities do not own multiple
banks, so this is the same as municipal fixed e↵ects.
When estimating equation (1), rather than working with annual observations, we run
the regressions using pre- and post-EU median values of all variables.23 For most of the
variables there are thus two observations for each bank, a pre-EU median and a post-EU
23Our estimation method is based on a suggestion of Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) for
di↵erence analyses in the presence of serially correlated errors. We use medians, instead of means, in
order to obtain estimates that are robust with respect to outliers.
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median. An exception to this is MuniLoans, for which we only use the pre-EU median
value. We do this because we are concerned about the substantial increase, for reasons that
are outside of our study, in the quantity of municipal lending by the treatment banks after
Austria joined the EU. By keeping MuniLoans constant at the pre-EU level we are able
to determine the di↵erence in profit changes for banks that did di↵erent levels of related
lending prior to the EU accession. If the pre-EU municipal lending was unprofitable
for the municipally owned banks, then those banks that did more of this lending should
experience a relatively smaller drop in profitability post-EU. We also perform robustness
tests using both the pre- and post-EU values of MuniLoans and find the qualitative results
to be unchanged. Because MuniLoans and Govt are constant across time and we run fixed
e↵ects regressions, these variables do not appear alone in equation (1).24
If the null hypothesis H1 holds, then the coe cient a2 is negative and the coe cient
a4 is zero. Our null is that the municipally owned banks were no di↵erent than the
non-municipal banks in terms of the change in profitability of lending to municipalities
following Austria’s EU accession. The results of estimating equation (1) are presented in
Table 3. Columns (1) to (3) present results without the triple interaction term; columns
(4) to (6) present the results of testing the full equation. The coe cient on postEU is
positive for RoA and negative for net interest and interest revenue, indicating an increase
in RoA post-EU, but a decrease in interest and net interest, relative to total loans. The
decreases make sense, given that competition from banks outside of Austria increased
following the EU accession. And, as expected, the decrease in interest revenue is greater
than the decrease in net interest revenue. The coe cient on postEU⇥Govt is negative
for RoA and interest revenue, indicating that municipal (Govt) banks su↵ered more when
Austria joined the EU.
24We also run random e↵ects regressions as robustness checks, including MuniLoans and Govt as
separate variables. The results are consistent with those reported in the paper. We do not report these
results as our tests of the validity of using random e↵ects failed.
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Place Table 3 here.
We next check whether the drop in profitability was worse for banks that had done
more municipal lending in the pre-EU period. For most of the specifications the coe cient
on postEU⇥MuniLoans is negative, indicating that this is the case. This result is not
surprising because, in lending to municipalities there was not only increased competition,
but also new regulations regarding the transparency of the lending process.
It is, however, the case that municipal banks that did more municipal lending in
the pre-EU period experienced a significantly smaller drop in profitability following the
EU accession. In columns (4) to (6) we note that the coe cient on the di↵erence-in-
di↵erence variable, postEU⇥Govt⇥MuniLoans, is significantly positive in all three re-
gressions. In addition, as is indicated at the bottom of Table 3, the combined coe cients
on postEU⇥MuniLoans and postEU⇥Govt⇥MuniLoans are significantly positive.25 We
are thus able to reject our null hypothesis H1: municipally owned banks were significantly
di↵erent than the non-municipal banks in terms of the change in profitability of lending to
municipalities post-EU. These results are consistent with the idea that municipalities used
related lending to transfer profits out of their banks prior to Austria’s EU membership,
and that such transfers ended, or significantly decreased, after Austria joined the EU.
The results are statistically significant for all three of our performance measures, return
25All of the regression results presented in tables in this paper are for OLS regressions with bank-
specific fixed e↵ects and no clustering of standard errors. We also ran the regressions with clustering
of errors at the state level. We did this because the state governments may have some influence on
the municipally-owned banks, causing the errors to be correlated for banks in the same state. Doing so
increases the significance of our results. The problem, however, is that we have a small number of clusters
(Austria has only 9 states) and this can lead to a bias in the standard errors. A simple fix suggested
by Cameron and Miller (2013) is to compute Wald statistics based on a T distribution, rather than a
standard normal. Using this fix, we obtain significance levels that are lower than with clustered errors
and Normality, but higher than with no clustering. In the interest of being conservative, we report in the
tables the results with no clustering. We would like to thank the referee for pointing this issue out to us.
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on assets, net interest revenues/total loans and interest revenues/total loans. The results
are strongest, however, for return on assets. This is as we expected, given that return on
assets takes into account opportunity costs of lending to the municipalities.
We next check that the results are robust to controlling for a number of municipal
characteristics. To this end we estimate the following regression equation:
DVi,t = b1 ⇥ postEUt + b2 ⇥ postEUt ⇥MuniLoansi + bXXi,t + bY Yi,t(2)
+ ui + ✏i,t
where Yi,t is a vector of municipal control variables: municipal debt per capita, a dummy
variable that equals one if the regional GDP per capita is above the median, and the num-
ber of bank branches in the municipality. Equation (2) is estimated only for the munici-
pally owned banks, as the other banks are not associated with a single municipality. For
the results to be robust to the municipal controls the coe cient on postEU⇥MuniLoans
in equation (2) should be positive and of similar magnitude to the combined coe cients
on postEU⇥MuniLoans and postEU⇥Govt⇥MuniLoans in equation (1).
The results of estimating equation (2) are presented in the first three columns of
Table 4. We find that the coe cients are positive and of similar magnitude. In the RoA
regression the coe cient is a bit larger and more statistically significant in Table 4 than
in Table 3, indicating that the municipal controls strengthen the result with respect to
return on assets. In the net interest revenue and interest revenue regressions the opposite
is seen; the coe cients are somewhat smaller and no longer statistically significant in Table
4, indicating that the municipal controls have somewhat weakened the result with respect
to interest and net interest revenues. In all cases, however, the results are consistent with
the results reported in Table 3.
Place Table 4 here.
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As a final check, in the fourth column of Table 4 we report the results of a regression
that is similar to that in column (1), except that we replace postEU⇥MuniLoans with
postEU⇥Non-municipal loans, in order to check if post-EU profitability is also positively
related to lending to other clients.26 The coe cient on post-EU⇥Non-municipal loans is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that non-municipal lending became less
profitable after Austria joined the EU. This interpretation is consistent with the increase
in bank competition that occurred in Austria after the country joined the EU.
In comparison, it is quite striking that the coe cient on postEU⇥MuniLoans in col-
umn (1) is significantly positive. If increased competition were the dominant e↵ect of
Austria’s EU membership, then we should observe reduced profitability for all types of
lending activity, resulting in a negative coe cient for postEU⇥MuniLoans. The sig-
nificantly positive coe cient on postEU⇥MuniLoans is consistent with the notion that
municipalities were looting their banks prior to EU membership.27 In the following section
we explore this notion further.
B. Politics and Related Lending
We now examine the e↵ect of politics on the di↵erences documented in the previous sec-
tion. The motivation for the analysis in this section is the hypothesis put forth in Section
2 that politicians with lower probabilities of reelection are more likely to loot their banks.
As an alternative to the null hypothesis H2, the hypothesis states that banks owned by
26This check makes sense in that total loans divided by total assets is typically less than one. We
do not perform this check for columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 because the muni loans variable in those
regressions is municipal loans/total loans, so non-municipal loans/total loans is just 1-MuniLoans.
27When we repeat the analysis of Tables 3 and 4 using both pre- and post-EU values of MuniLoans
we obtain the same results. However, due to the significant increase in municipal loans post-EU, there is
concern that the results could be caused by realized economies of scale. By using only the pre-EU values
of municipal loans we avoid this concern.
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municipalities with more competitive politics should have realized greater improvements
in the profitability of their related lending than banks owned by municipalities with less
political competition.
Our main objective in this section is to look for a specific cause that may have in-
duced municipalities to use related lending to transfer profits out of their banks: political
competition. In order to be able to assign a causal interpretation to our results we form
measures of political competition that we believe are exogenous with respect to related
lending and bank profitability. To this end we focus on the persistence of political com-
petition, rather than on any particular election, and we form measures of this persistence
using data from elections that took place prior to 1995. In addition, we use data about
local voting for representatives to the national assembly, rather than using data about
elections for municipal o cials. The political competition variables are described in detail
in Section 3.2 and summarized in Table 2.
We use these political competition variables to divide the municipal banks into two
groups. Those municipalities with noncompetitive political environments (high reelection
probability) are assigned a value of Pol = 0; those municipalities with competitive political
environments (lower reelection probability) are assigned a value of Pol = 1. In Table 5 we
present summary statistics that enable us to examine similarities and di↵erences between
these two subsets of our sample. In this table we segment the data not only between pre-
and post-EU observations, but also according to the Pol1 variable.28 Columns (3) and (6)
indicate that in terms of pre-EU to post-EU changes our segmented samples are similar to
the full sample reported in Table 1. The means of four of our variables exhibit significant
change from the pre-EU to the post-EU period: net interest revenue divided by total loans
and interest revenue/total loans both decreased, while the fraction of municipal loans on
the banks’ balance sheets and the GDP per capita increased.
28Summary statistics are qualitatively unchanged if we split the sample by Pol2.
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Place Table 5 here.
In the last three columns of Table 5 we report t-statistics on the di↵erences between
the banks owned by politically competitive and noncompetitive municipalities. In column
(7) and (8) we report the t-statistics for the di↵erences in the pre-EU and post-EU means,
respectively. We observe a number of di↵erences, especially in the pre-EU period (column
(7)). Banks located in politically competitive regions are on average larger and have
a smaller fraction of municipal loans on their balance sheets. There is, however, no
significant di↵erence in the municipal debt per capita between these sets of municipalities
and no significant di↵erence in the ratio of municipal loans to municipal debt between
the two subsets of banks.29 It thus appears that the higher fraction of municipal loans
on the balance sheets of banks in politically non-competitive areas is due to the fact that
these banks are on average smaller. We also note that the municipalities in politically
competitive areas have significantly higher GDP per capita and a greater number of bank
branches. These banks thus appear to face more competition in their lending. Consistent
with this observation the banks in politically competitive areas also have lower net interest
revenue relative to their total loans.
In column (9) we report t-statistics for di↵erences in these di↵erences: columns ((2)-
(1)) - ((5)-(4)). Our objective is to determine if the di↵erences, for which t-statistics
are reported in columns (3) and (6), are significantly di↵erent between the two sets of
banks. The only significant di↵erences are in GDP per capita and the number of bank
branches. Banks that are owned by politically competitive municipalities are located in
regions that had higher GDP per capita and more bank branches both pre- and post-EU,
and that exhibited greater increases in both of these measures after Austria joined the
EU. We explore these relationships in depth in the following section of the paper. It is
notable that, apart from these two variables, we find no significant di↵erence-in-di↵erence
29This latter test is not tabulated, as this variable is not included in any of our regressions.
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between banks owned by politically competitive and noncompetitive municipalities.
Table 6 presents correlations between variables that are summarized in Tables 1 and
2.30 The three performance measures, return on assets (RoA), net interest revenue/total
loans and interest revenue/total loans are all positively correlated, although the corre-
lation between RoA and interest revenue is not significant in the pre-EU period. The
performance measures are all negatively correlated with the number of bank branches,
as is to be expected. These measures are not significantly correlated with municipal
loans/total assets (MuniLoans), with the exception of interest revenue in the post-EU pe-
riod. Bank size is negatively correlated with MuniLoans and positively correlated with the
political competition variable. Consistent with this, MuniLoans is negatively correlated
with political competition in the pre-EU period.
Place Table 6 here.
We have seen that banks owned by politically competitive municipalities had a smaller
fraction of their assets in loans to the municipalities, but this may be due to the fact that
these banks are also larger on average than banks owned by politically noncompetitive
municipalities. We now examine whether the loans that politically competitive munici-
palities obtained from their banks in the pre-EU period were relatively less profitable for
the banks. To do so we employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erence specification that is similar to
that reported in Table 3, except that we now include only municipally owned banks and
we substitute the dummy variable Pol for Govt. We run the following regression:
RoAi,t = c1 ⇥ postEUt + c2 ⇥ postEUt ⇥MuniLoansi + c3 ⇥ postEUt ⇥ Poli(3)
+ c4 ⇥ postEUt ⇥ Poli ⇥MuniLoansi + cXXi,t + cY Yi,t + ui + ✏i,t ,
30We use log(total assets), rather than total assets in this table, as this is the variable that is used in
the regressions.
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where postEU is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is in the post-
EU period, MuniLoans is municipal loans/total assets, and Pol is a dummy variable
that equals one if the municipality is politically competitive. Xi,t and Yi,t are the same
vectors of control variables as in equation (2): non-municipal loans divided by total assets,
log(total assets), municipal debt per capita, a dummy variable that equals one if the
regional GDP per capita is above the median, and the number of bank branches in the
municipality.
The coe cient on postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans captures the di↵erence-in-di↵erence ef-
fect, i.e., the di↵erential e↵ect of EU membership on related lending for banks owned by
politically competitive municipalities. If the null hypothesis H2 of Section 2.2 is correct,
then this coe cient should be zero. If instead, the hypothesis put forth in Section 2.1
that politicians facing competition are more likely to loot their banks is correct, then the
coe cient on postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans should be positive. The estimates for equation
(3) are presented in Table 7. We only present results with RoA as the dependent variable.
We find no evidence for a statistically significant relation between net interest or interest
revenue and political competition. It thus seems that political competition a↵ects the
profitability of the banks’ lending to municipalities through the banks’ ability to break
even on opportunity costs that show up in the banks’ RoA, but not in interest revenues.
The latter observation is consistent with the results in Section 4.1 which also suggest a
stronger e↵ect of municipal ownership on the profitability of municipal lending if prof-
itability is measured in terms of RoA rather than net interest or interest revenue. The
weaker e↵ect of municipal ownership on the latter two measures suggests that the lack
of evidence for a significant e↵ect of political competition may simply be a consequence
of splitting our sample into subsamples of banks owned by politically competitive and
noncompetitive municipalities.
Place Table 7 here.
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Table 7 presents estimates of equation (3) with each of the political variables, Pol1
and Pol2, that are summarized in Table 2. In columns (1) and (2) MuniLoans is set at a
constant pre-EU value, as in Tables 3 and 4. The coe cient on postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans
is positive and significant in columns (1) and (2), indicating that the null hypothesis H2
does not hold.31 The coe cient on postEU⇥MuniLoans continues to be positive, but the
magnitude of this coe cient is on the order of half the magnitude reported for the same
e↵ect in column (1) of Table 4. That is, we find evidence consistent with municipalities
using related lending to transfer profits out of their banks for both sets of municipally
owned banks. However, the evidence is stronger for those banks owned by the set of
municipalities where elected o cials face greater reelection uncertainty. These results are
consistent with the predictions developed in Section 2.1.
To gauge the economic importance of these results, consider a government-owned
bank that has an average amount of lending to municipalities and is located in a politi-
cally competitive municipality. Such a bank would have had, on average municipal loans
equal to 2.5% of assets prior to Austria joining the EU. This level of municipal lending
resulted in a pre-EU return on assets that was lower by approximately 22 basis points
(0.025⇥0.0875).32 Multiplied by the average bank size of 556 million Euros, this repre-
sents a loss of 1.22 million Euros per bank, per year. Banks in politically noncompetitive
areas were on average smaller, so municipal lending was relatively larger for them. For
these banks municipal lending in the pre-EU period resulted in a pre-EU return on assets
that was lower by approximately 14 basis points (0.048⇥0.0295).33 This represents an
31If we cluster the errors at the state level, the coe cients on postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans in columns
(1) and (2) are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
32The coe cients listed at the bottom of Table 7 for postEU⇥MuniLoans + postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans
are 0.090 and 0.085 for Pol1 and Pol2 respectively. The average of these is 0.0875.
330.0295 is the average of the coe cients for postEU⇥MuniLoans in the Pol1 and Pol2 columns of
Table 7.
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average loss of only 0.21 million Euros per bank, per year (0.0014⇥153 mil.Euros). Tak-
ing into account that municipal lending increased after Austria joined the EU, the event
of Austria joining the EU increased the average bank’s profits by significantly more than
the 1.22 million and 0.21 Euros calculated here.
Again we check that municipal loans are di↵erent from all other loans. To do this we re-
run the regression of equation (3), but replace postEU⇥MuniLoans and postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans
with postEU⇥Non-muni loans and postEU⇥Pol⇥Non-muni loans. The results of this re-
gression are not reported in the paper, but the coe cient on the triple interaction term
is insignificant and the coe cient on postEU⇥Non-muni loans + postEU⇥Pol⇥Non-
muni loans is negative and significant. Thus, loans to municipalities are di↵erent from
loans to other entities. It is only the municipal loans that exhibit signs of looting in
the pre-EU period. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 we present results that use both
the pre- and post-EU values of MuniLoans as a robustness check. The coe cients on
postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans in these columns are consistent with those in columns (1) and
(2), but are not statistically significant by common standards.34
Table 7 also shows that banks in politically competitive municipalities underperformed
on average by 30 or 40 basis points, after Austria joined the EU (see the coe cients of
post-EU⇥Pol in columns (1) and (2)). In order to examine the e↵ect of politics alone,
we estimate a specification similar to equation (3), but without any of the terms con-
taining MuniLoans. We find (also untabulated in the paper) that the political vari-
ables by themselves (not interacted with MuniLoans) have weaker explanatory power for
bank profitability. That is, political competition seems to a↵ect the profitability of these
government-owned banks through their lending to municipalities.
Finally, we consider an alternative interpretation of the results of this section: perhaps
34The p-values are 0.167 and 0.154 in columns (3) and (4), respectively. If we cluster the errors at
the state level, the coe cients on postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans in columns (3) and (4) are significant at the
10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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all municipal banks were looted prior to Austria’s EU accession, but the EU rules were
more e↵ectively enforced in locations with greater political competition. In columns (3)
and (4) of Table 7 the coe cients on MuniLoans and Pol⇥ MuniLoans are all negative,
indicating that lending to municipalities was unprofitable in the pre-EU period. The
coe cients on Pol⇥ MuniLoans are not, however, statistically significant, so we cannot
rule out the possibility of better enforcement post-EU. We explore this idea further in the
following section.
C. GDP, Bank Competition and Political Competition
Our above analysis documents that Austria’s EU accession was associated with changes
in the profitability of municipally owned banks’ lending to their owners, and that those
changes were associated with political competition. In this section we explore the latter
association further. As discussed in Section 2, Austria’s EU accession resulted in both
an increase in the transparency of the banks’ lending to their owners, and a removal of
entry barriers in banking markets. These two e↵ects are related in that the increase in
transparency was meant to ensure public procurement at competitive market prices, and
such prices can only be observed in the presence of competition.
We next explore an alternative interpretation of our results, based on the idea that our
measures of political competition may pick up e↵ects of an increase in the competitive-
ness of banking markets. An increase in banking competition can have two e↵ects that
are relevant for our analysis. First, it may reduce the opportunity costs that banks in-
cur in lending to the municipalities, causing municipal lending to become relatively more
profitable. However, as our results in Section 4.1 indicate, it appears that lending to mu-
nicipalities also became more competitive and less profitable, at least for non-municipally
controlled banks. The second e↵ect is that greater banking competition in the post-EU
period may have led to better enforcement of the EU rules. As suggested by Levine (2004)
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enforcement by competitors can be more e↵ective than enforcement by regulators.
We have already noted that the politically competitive municipalities have on average
higher GDP per capita and a greater number of bank branches. These are both variables
that we expect to be positively correlated with competition for municipal lending.35 We
begin the analysis of this section by attempting to reproduce our main results using High
GDPC instead of our Pol variables. High GDPC equals one if the municipality’s GDP
per capita is greater than the median GDP in our sample. We reestimate equation (3),
replacing all occurrences of the political competition indicator variable with High GDPC.
The results, presented in the first column of Table 8, are quite similar to our main
results presented in Table 7. Most importantly, the coe cient for the interaction term
post-EU⇥High GDPC⇥MuniLoans is positive and significant.36 We then repeat the same
exercise using the number of bank branches instead of High GDPC. The results of the
latter estimation (not tabulated in this paper) are similar, but much weaker. That is,
we are able to replicate the results of Table 7 using GDP per capita instead of political
competition as one of our main variables of interest, but we are unable to replicate the
results using the number of bank branches. These results are not surprising given that
both GDP per capita and the number of bank branches are positively correlated with our
political variables, but GDP is more highly correlated. For the remainder of this section
we focus on GDP per capita.
35Municipalities may borrow from banks that do not have branches in the town. We expect outside
banks to pay more attention to municipalities with higher GDP. It is for this reason that we consider
both GDP and the number of bank branches as possible proxies for competition in municipal lending.
Moreover, while these two variables are positively correlated, the correlation in our sample is not as high
as that reported in other studies such as Claessens and Laeven (2004) who report a correlation coe cient
of 0.69 between the number of banks and GDP per capita.
36If we cluster the errors at the state level, this coe cient is significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic
that is similar to that of postEU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans in column (2) of Table 7.
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Place Table 8 here.
To determine which variable, political competition or GDP per capita, captures the
more important relation for our analysis we next examine segmented samples of our
data. In the second and third columns of Table 8 we repeat the analysis of the first
column, but with our data set split according to the political competition variable Pol1.
The coe cient for the interacted term post-EU⇥High GDPC⇥MuniLoans is insignificant.
Once we control for political competition, GDP per capita has much less explanatory
power for our main results concerning the post-EU change in the profitability of municipal
lending. To determine if the results found in the first column of Table 8 occur only because
of the correlation between GDP per capita and political competition we next present a
similar segmented analysis, but in reverse. In the fourth and fifth columns of Table 8 the
sample is segmented according to High GDPC. We again focus on the triple interaction
term, post-EU⇥Pol⇥MuniLoans. In column (4), which presents the results for the subset
of banks located in regions with above-the-median GDP per capita, the coe cient for this
interacted term is positive and close to significant. In column (5), low GDP per capita,
the coe cient for this interacted term is insignificant.37
In summary, we find evidence that is consistent with a political explanation for munic-
ipalities transferring profits out of their banks when the banks engage in related lending
to the municipalities. It is possible, however, that the increased transparency of related
lending around Austria’s EU accession more e↵ectively curtailed the looting of banks lo-
cated in regions with relatively high GDP per capita. Our evidence is consistent with the
idea that such regions attracted more competition for lending to municipalities, thus es-
tablishing benchmarks for the terms at which the latter banks could lend to their owners.
37If we cluster the errors at the state level, the coe cient on post-EU⇥High GDPC⇥MuniLoans
continues to be insignificant in column (2) and is significant at the 10% level in column (3). The coe cient
on the triple interaction term in column (4) is significant at the 1% level. In column (5) it remains
insignificant.
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This interpretation is consistent with Levine (2004) and articles in the Austrian popular
press; for example, the looting example mentioned at the end of section 2.1. In the case
of Hypo Group Alpe Adria, this article specifically mentions the mechanism of granting
below market rate loans to a municipality. It also confirms that the Commission of the
European Union actively enforces EU regulation. And, consistent with our discussion of
the role of GDP per capita and competition, the Hypo Group Alpe Adria bank is located
in a geographic area with high levels of political competition, but relatively low economic
wealth. This might explain why the looting behavior was still going on a number of years
after Austria joined the EU.
V. Conclusion
This paper extends our current understanding of the situation in which governments act in
a dual role as owners of and borrowers from banks. Most importantly, we document a link
between “looting” through related lending and the probability that a related borrower’s
position of control with respect to the bank will endure. Using a unique data set about
municipally owned banks we find evidence consistent with the “looting” explanation of
related lending: that is, evidence that related lending has been used to transfer profits
out of the banks. We show that such evidence is strongest for banks that are owned
by municipalities in which there is a competitive political environment. These results
are consistent with our hypothesis that incumbent politicians who are more likely to lose
reelection are also more likely to use related lending to transfer profits from a government-
owned bank to the government co↵ers. These transfers can be damaging, as they crowd
out private borrowers. We also find that the evidence is stronger in areas with higher
GDP per capita. This result is consistent with the notion that more competition for
lending to the municipalities occurs in these areas, and such competition can enhance the
e↵ectiveness of bank regulations.
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By documenting evidence of looting through related lending in a developed country
with high legal standards, we extend the discussion of related lending beyond the scope
of emerging markets with low governance standards. Our results suggest that in markets
with a high rule of law mandating transparency for government banking transactions can
be valuable. The results also suggest, however, that for this transparency to be e↵ective,
it is necessary to have stakeholders with incentives to monitor, such as competing banks.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of financial variables. For each of the 53 municipal
and 22 non-municipal banks a median value was calculated for each variable of interest for
the years from 1990 to 1994 (pre-EU) and a second median was calculated for the years
from 1995 to 1999 (post-EU). This table reports summary statistics for these median
values. Stars next to the means in the Post-EU panels indicate di↵erences between pre-
EU and post-EU means that are significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*) level.
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Municipal Banks Before EU Accession (Pre-EU)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Return on assets, RoA 0.0083 0.0029 0.0081 53
Net interest revenue/total loans 0.0454 0.0064 0.0457 53
Interest revenue/total loans 0.1080 0.0066 0.1077 53
Total assets (Mil.Euros), TA 343 665 164 53
Municipal loans/total assets 0.036 0.029 0.033 53
Non Municipal loans/total assets 0.728 0.067 0.726 53
Muni. debt per capita (Thou. Euros) 1.104 0.913 0.898 53
GDP per capita (Thou. Euros) 15.159 3.913 14.000 53
Number of bank branches 8.74 10.73 5 53
Municipal Banks After EU Accession (Post-EU)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Return on assets, RoA 0.0076 0.0041 0.0070 53
Net interest revenue/total loans 0.0391*** 0.0073 0.0393 53
Interest revenue/total loans 0.0790*** 0.0094 0.0801 53
Total assets (Mil.Euros), TA 456 836 213 53
Municipal loans/total assets 0.173*** 0.074 0.181 53
Non Municipal loans/total assets 0.730 0.065 0.737 53
Muni. debt per capita (Thou. Euros) 1.390 1.038 1.184 53
GDP per capita (Thou. Euros) 18.68*** 4.858 16.800 53
Number of bank branches 9.01 10.86 5 53
Non-municipal Banks Before EU Accession (Pre-EU)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Return on assets, RoA 0.0036 0.0018 0.0031 22
Net interest revenue/total loans 0.0190 0.0098 0.0166 22
Interest revenue/total loans 0.0749 0.0292 0.0727 22
Total assets (Mil.Euros), TA 555 896 237 22
Municipal loans/total assets 0.077 0.067 0.045 22
Non Municipal loans/total assets 0.811 0.058 0.817 22
Non-municipal Banks After EU Accession (Post-EU)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Return on assets, RoA 0.0044 0.0020 0.0042 22
Net interest revenue/total loans 0.0139** 0.0064 0.0125 22
Interest revenue/total loans 0.0548*** 0.0166 0.0534 22
Total assets (Mil.Euros), TA 805 994 416 22
Municipal loans/total assets 0.044** 0.023 0.045 22
Non Municipal loans/total assets 0.781* 0.051 0.782 22
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Table 2: Summary statistics of political variables. The political variables were
created using data from two elections for local representatives to the national government.
The two elections took place before 1995 (1990 and 1994). Not Stable (Pol1) is equal to
zero if the same party won both elections by a margin of at least 10%; otherwise Pol1
is equal to one. Non-Dominant winner (Pol2) is equal to zero if one party obtained, on
average across the two elections, at least 45% of the votes; otherwise Pol2 is equal to
one. A value of one (zero) for any political variable indicates a high (low) level of political
competition. High GDPC equals one if the GDP per capita is greater than the median
value for our sample of banks, in each period (pre- and post-EU). Panel B uses the pre-EU
values for High GDPC.
Panel A: Political Variables
Non-dominant winner, Pol2
# equal to 1 # equal to 0 Pol1 total
Not Stable, # equal to 1 25 0 25
Pol1 # equal to 0 3 25 28
Pol2 total 28 25 53
Panel B: Politics and GDP






Table 3: Bank Ownership, Municipal Lending and Performance: Private and
Government-owned Banks. OLS regressions with bank-specific fixed e↵ects. The
dependent variable is either return on assets, RoA, net interest revenue/total loans, or
interest revenue/total loans. PostEU is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and
zero otherwise. MuniLoans in columns (1) and (4) is the ratio of municipal loans to total
assets in the pre-EU period; in the remaining columns MuniLoans is the ratio of the bank’s
municipal loans to total loans, pre-EU. Govt is equal to one if the bank is a government-
owned (municipal) bank and zero otherwise. TA is total assets. For each bank there
is one observation pre-EU (postEU=0) and one post-EU (postEU=1). MuniLoans and
Govt are constant across these two observations. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: RoA NetIntRev IntRev RoA NetIntRev IntRev
postEU 0.002 -0.004** -0.019*** 0.003** -0.004** -0.018***
(1.62) (-2.03) (-3.43) (2.08) (-2.68) (-3.61)
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans 0.000 -0.014** -0.064*** -0.013 -0.021* -0.085
(0.05) (-2.35) (-3.91) (-1.47) (-1.83) (-1.70)
postEU ⇥ Govt -0.002* 0.000 -0.006 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.010**
(-1.83) (0.14) (-1.25) (-3.39) (-0.47) (-2.11)
postEU ⇥ Govt ⇥ MuniLoans 0.053*** 0.043** 0.125**
(2.97) (2.65) (2.09)
Non-Municipal loans/TA -0.013** -0.022***
(-2.32) (-3.64)
Total loans/TA -0.013** -0.030* -0.020** -0.050*
(-2.04) (-1.71) (-2.25) (-1.98)
Log(TA) -0.004* -0.000 0.011 -0.003 -0.000 0.010
(-1.85) (-0.05) (1.23) (-1.64) (-0.12) (1.28)
R-squared (within) 0.165 0.661 0.833 0.260 0.689 0.848
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
Groups (number of banks) 75 75 75 75 75 75
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans + 0.040** 0.022** 0.040*
postEU ⇥ Govt ⇥ MuniLoans (2.60) (2.14) (1.81)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Municipal Lending and Performance: Government-owned Banks only.
OLS regressions with bank-specific fixed e↵ects. The dependent variable is either return
on assets, RoA, net interest revenue/total loans, or interest revenue/total loans. PostEU
is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero otherwise. MuniLoans in columns
(1) and (4) is the ratio of municipal loans to total assets in the pre-EU period; in the
remaining columns MuniLoans is the ratio of the bank’s municipal loans to total loans,
pre-EU. Municipal debt and municipal GDP are for the municipality that owns the bank.
High GDPC equals one if the GDP per capita is greater than the median value for our
sample of banks, in each period (pre- and post-EU). TA is total assets. For each bank
there is one observation pre-EU (postEU=0) and one post-EU (postEU=1). MuniLoans
is constant across these two observations. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: RoA NetIntRev IntRev RoA
postEU -0.001 -0.003 -0.030*** 0.015***
(-0.43) (-1.42) (-8.06) (2.92)




postEU ⇥ Non-Muni.loans/TA -0.020**
(-2.64)
Total loans/TA -0.016** -0.028**
(-2.11) (-2.20)
Muni.debt per capita -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002 -0.002**
(-2.91) (-1.78) (-1.19) (-2.29)
High GDPC 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.003
(0.76) (-0.54) (-0.34) (1.13)
Number of banks 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.90) (0.16) (-0.64) (1.07)
Log(TA) -0.005 -0.004 0.014 -0.005
(-1.46) (-0.75) (1.55) (-1.37)
R-squared (within) 0.449 0.729 0.949 0.422
Observations 106 106 106 106
Groups (number of banks) 53 53 53 53

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Politics and Related Lending: RoA Causal E↵ects. Government-
owned Banks only. OLS regressions with bank-specific fixed e↵ects. The dependent
variable is return on assets, RoA. PostEU is equal to one if the observation is after 1995
and zero otherwise. MuniLoans is the ratio of municipal loans to total assets. In columns
(1) and (2) only the pre-EU value of MuniLoans is used; in columns (3) and (4) both pre-
and post-EU values of MuniLoans are used. We use two variables to identify politically
competitive municipalities: Pol1 and Pol2 are defined in Table 2. Municipal debt and
municipal GDP are for the municipality that owns the bank. High GDPC equals one if the
GDP per capita is greater than the median value for our sample of banks, in each period
(pre- and post-EU). TA is total assets. For each bank there is one observation pre-EU
(postEU=0) and one post-EU (postEU=1). Pol is constant across these two observations;
in columns (1) and (2) MuniLoans is also constant across the two observations. t-statistics
are given in parentheses.
42
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable = RoA pre-EU MuniLoans pre- and post-EU MuniLoans
Political Variable: Pol1 Pol2 Pol1 Pol2
MuniLoans -0.029* -0.026
(-1.74) (-1.53)
Pol ⇥ MuniLoans -0.028 -0.029
(-0.79) (-0.83)
postEU 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.88) (1.03) (0.60) (0.87)
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans 0.031* 0.028 0.029* 0.026
(1.88) (1.65) (1.71) (1.45)
postEU ⇥ Pol -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005**
(-2.71) (-2.42) (-2.77) (-2.58)
postEU ⇥ Pol ⇥ MuniLoans 0.059* 0.057* 0.045 0.045
(1.90) (1.87) (1.41) (1.45)
Non-Muni.loans/TA -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.030***
(-4.08) (-3.90) (-3.73) (-3.54)
Muni.debt per capita -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-2.93) (-2.85) (-2.76) (-2.76)
High GDPC 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.28) (0.26) (0.33) (0.33)
Number of banks 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.09) (-0.17) (0.79) (0.46)
Log(TA) -0.005 -0.006* -0.005 -0.006*
(-1.55) (-1.74) (-1.46) (-1.72)
R-squared (within) 0.508 0.492 0.540 0.522
Observations 106 106 106 106
Groups (number of banks) 53 53 53 53
MuniLoans + Pol ⇥ MuniLoans -0.057 -0.055
(-1.53) (-1.53)
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans + 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.074** 0.071**
postEU ⇥ Pol ⇥ MuniLoans (2.80) (2.72) (2.23) (2.21)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Politics, GDP per capita and Related Lending: Government-owned
Banks only. OLS regressions with bank-specific fixed e↵ects. The dependent variable is
return on assets, RoA. PostEU is equal to one if the observation is after 1995 and zero
otherwise. MuniLoans is the ratio of municipal loans to total assets in the pre-EU period.
Municipal debt and GDP are for the municipality that owns the bank. High GDPC equals
one if the GDP per capita is greater than the median value for our sample of banks, in
each period (pre- and post-EU). TA is total assets. For each bank there is one observation
pre-EU (postEU=0) and one post-EU (postEU=1). MuniLoans and Pol1 are constant
across these two observations. In columns (2) and (3) the sample is segmented according
to Pol1, which is defined in Table 2; in columns (4) and (5) the sample is segmented
according to High GDPC. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dependent variable = RoA Full Sample Pol1=1 Pol1=0 Hi GDPC=1 Hi GDPC=0
postEU 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004
(0.25) (-0.05) (0.19) (-0.59) (1.64)
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans 0.027 -0.001 0.024 0.075** 0.000
(1.48) (-0.01) (1.13) (2.47) (0.00)
postEU ⇥ High GDPC -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.07) (-0.51) (-0.22)
postEU ⇥ High GDPC ⇥ MuniLoans 0.054** 0.082 0.029
(2.09) (1.04) (0.86)
postEU ⇥ Pol1 -0.003* -0.000
(-2.06) (-0.16)
postEU ⇥ Pol1 ⇥ MuniLoans 0.064 -0.045
(1.48) (-0.69)
Non-municipal loans/TA -0.027*** -0.024 -0.029** -0.045*** -0.013
(-3.34) (-1.23) (-2.41) (-4.01) (-0.97)
Muni.debt per capita -0.002*** -0.005 -0.001* -0.003* -0.002**
(-2.90) (-1.65) (-1.85) (-1.81) (-2.35)
High GDPC 0.001 0.001
(0.50) (0.32)
Number of banks -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.82) (-0.46) (0.03) (0.14) (0.06)
Log(TA) -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.010*
(-1.34) (-0.40) (-0.58) (-0.14) (-2.03)
R-squared (within) 0.482 0.649 0.480 0.717 0.521
Observations 106 50 56 50 56
Groups (number of banks) 53 25 28 25 28
postEU ⇥ MuniLoans + 0.138*** -0.044
postEU ⇥ Pol1 ⇥ MuniLoans (3.52) (-0.66)
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